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Intisari
Tulisan ini berusaha menganalisis dua hal pokok, yakni darnpak krisis di
perdesaanJazvadanresponspemerintahlokal/pemerintahandesa terhadapkrisis
moneter. Secara tegas dikatakan bahwa masyarakat perdesaan ]awa heterogen
dan penuh dengan variasi dan ketidaksamaan. Oleh karena itu,dampak krisis
moneter didesa juga sangat bervariasi tergantungpada wilayah, status sosial
ekonomi,pekerjaan,dansistemekonomi. Karenakrisis,adakelompokmasyarakat
yang "menang"(diuntungkan)yaitukelompokyangmempunyaiakses terhadap
sumber daya dan ada kelompok yang "kalah" (dirugikan) yaitu kelompok
masyarakat miskin. Selama krisis,berbagai institusitradisionalyangberfungsi
sebagaisocialsecurity,sepertigotong-royongdansolidaritassosial lainnyatidak
berperan besar. Bahkan, pemerintah lokal/pemerintahan desa pun tidak
melakukanupayamaksimaldalammenghadapinya.Dalamkenyataannya,peran
aktivitas individualjauh lebih besar dibandingkan dengan aktivitas kolektif.
Introduction
The anthropologist Jellinek
stated that the effects of the crisis,
whichhit Indonesiaayear before,
did not affect rural people that
much. On behalf of the World
Bank,she hadcarriedout a rapid
appraisalof theeffects of the crisis
in Indonesia in four places.
According toher,theeffects of the
crisis were much worse in the
cities (Kompas, 10 February,
1999).At thebeginningof thecrisis
(1997/1998), Harmoko (the
spokesman of parliament and
prominent member of Golkar)
visitedsomeruralareas inCentral
Java to observe thesituationinthe
villages (safari Ramadhan). He
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spoke to village officials and had
dinner1 in one of the visited
villages. The dinner was well
prepared and after his visit,
Harmoko stated ininterviews on
the televisionandinnewsarticles
that thesituationinthe ruralareas
was not so badbecause he had a
good meal, implying that much
foodwas available inthe villages.
Bothstatements ofJellinek and
Harmoko are indicative for the
attitude of the Indonesian
government and a number of
academics inrespect to the crisis.
In the dominant government
discourse in Indonesia, villages
are often regarded as homo¬
geneous and harmonious
communities,able to take care for
its weaker members by gotong
royong and other traditional
arrangements of solidarity and
mutual help. In fact, this
stereotypical view has highly
blinded government employees
andintellectualsfor thehardships
of the ruralpoor and the existing
inequalities, like inequalities
between regions, economic
sectors, classes and within
villages. It is crucial to study this
diversity on the local level to
understandthedifferentialeffects
of the crisis and the -often
misplaced- responses of the
government on itseffects.
Inour view, during the crisis,
governmentconcern,analysisand
policies have been much more
focused
—
if focused at all
—
on
cities than on rural areas. This is
to acertainextentunderstandable
as in-depth studies of the crisis
were not made and hardly any
information or the effect of the
crisis was available. The central
government directed itsattention
mainly on the huge urban
problemsasmassunemployment,
budget deficits, firm bankruptcy
and restructuring of the banking
sector. The cause of this lack of
concern for rural areas in
Indonesia,was the lack of reliable
informationof these areas.Onthe
local level, the government
administrative systems were
therefore not equipped and not
able to anticipate and fight the
crisis.
Ourarticlewillpresent thecase
of two poor villages inJava du¬
ring the crisis and show the
differentialeffects of the crisis for
different categories of people
within these villages. The article
is based on long periods of
anthropological fieldwork's
during the crisis and offers in-
1 Buka puasa,breakingthe fast at the endof the Ramadhanafter sunset as the
trips took place duringthe Islamic fasting month.
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depthdataaboutpoverty,copying
strategies, labour and migration
and the role of the local govern¬
ment.2 The study of Kutanegara
took place in the village of
Sriharjo, Central Java,3 while
Nooteboom's study was carried
out inKrajan,4 a remotevillage in
Bondowoso, East Java. Sriharjo is
an example of a lowland village
with mainly commercialised
agriculture,anexcludedmajority
from access to landandwith a lot
of urban workers. Land owner¬
shipinSriharjooftenhasmoreand
more a symbolic function than a
production function. Krajanis an
example of those Indonesian
upland villages which are more
remote, more villagers with
—
direct and indirect
—
access to
landandwithlessurbanworkers.
Although Krajan is incorporated
in the market, subsistence
production is still important.
Long-term research is really
needed to understand the impact
of the crisis on the local level.
Foster states: "Long term
participant observation [...] can
yield understanding of social
change that issimplynotpossible
inany other way" (Foster, 1979).
Moreover,especially inJava, it is
difficult to gather in-depth
informationabout difficultiesand
hardships in life. As, during a
survey people do not easily talk
about thesesensitivesubjects.This
article therefore tries to offer an
'inside' view of the crisis. Itdeals
with four major subjects: 1) the
question about the nature of the
crisis and local perceptions and
experiences of the crisis, 2) the
changes inpovertyandinequality
during the crisis 3) changes in
labour and migration and 4) the
role of the local government in
respondingto the crisis.
The Crisis inIndonesia
Itcanbe said, that the crisis in
Indonesia took place at three
different levels and at the same
time. Three crises can be
distinguished:1)acurrency crisis,
2) a food crisis and 3) a political
crisis. These crises had several
interrelated causes and reasons,
which cannot be dealt with in
2 The article isbasedontwo PhDresearches carriedout frommid1997till the
end of 1998 and at the beginning of 1999. Bothstudies are part of a larger
project on Social Security and Social Policy inIndonesia carried out by the
Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta, the University of Amsterdam and
the University of Nijmegen.
3 This research is a restudy and extension of the well knownpoverty studies
of MasriSingarimbun (1973, 1976,1993).
4 Krajanisa pseudonym.
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detail in this article, as we want
focus especially on the local level
effects. Inthe following, the three
crises will bedescribed briefly.
1) The currency crisis started in
July 1997withslightly deterio¬
ratingexchange rates devalu¬
ating faster between Septem¬
berandNovember 1997.At the
beginningofJanuary 1998,the
Rupiah had already devalu¬
ated100percent (Figure1).In
the same month, the Rupiah
cameinafreefall. Inaresponse
on this devaluation, inflation
gotchallengedandfoodprices
started to rise.The first rise of
basic food prices,which isim¬
portant for ruralpopu-lations,
startedafterOctober 1997(Fig¬
ure2). Inthe village of Krajan,
villagers were aware of rising
prices, but really started to
worry about the food prices
during the Ramadhan (Decem¬
ber/January 1997/1998) (Fig¬
ure 3). InSriharjo this process
started somewhat earlier,
whichhasagreater proportion
of its population working in
the urbansector.
2) The food crisis started already
with the effects of El Nifto,
which caused droughts and
forest fires. Productionof rice
started to fall and in 1998 the
rice productiondeclined with
nearly10percent in1998com¬
pared with the 1996 level
Figure 1
Exchange Ratac Rupiahto US $
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Figure2
Food Price Index March 1997-September 1998
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(FAO, 1998). Many smallhol¬
ders experienceddifficultiesin
repayingdebts.Nationalshort¬
ages of rice started to enforce
the rise of rice prices. Statisti¬
caldata are oftennot that reli¬
able in Indonesia. We use for
the rice price data from the
FAO, which correspond ex¬
actly with the rice prices we
found inour researchareas.
3) Relatedto these developments,
a political crisis started to de¬
velop.The New Order regime
started toshow cracks andlost
legitimacy culmi-natinginthe
fall of Suharto in May 1998.
Oneof the reasonsof Suharto's
fall was that hedidnothingto
curb the crisis. The research
periods of 1998 and of 1999
were periods of political tur¬
moilenforcedbycorn-petition
betweendifferent factions and
regions. Habibie, the interim
president could not do much.
The politicaldisarray surely is
oneexplanationfor the lack of
government policies, stand¬
points and leadership that be¬
came clear during the crisis.
But, more structural reasons
canbementioned as well.
Inthe villages, the step down
of Suhartoassuchdidnotimpress
most villagers. In Krajan (East
Java) for instance, it look more
thanthreedaysbeforethemajority
of the population realised at all
that Suharto had stepped down
indeed.Andwhenvillagers heard
the news, they were not excited.
In their life world, Jakarta is far
away and villagers infact didnot
expect much from the national
government insolving their pro¬
blems. InSrihaijo (Central Java),
villagers were also not that
impressed by the news, but the
reasonswere different. Invillagers
perceptions, Jakarta is geo¬
graphically not so far away, but
according to them, national
politics are not that relevant for
their lives.
The Crisis inRural Indonesia
In 1996, the Australian
economist Hal Hill wrote an
optimistic book about the
modernisation and development
of the Indonesianeconomy: "The
Indonesian economy since 1966:
Asia's emerging Giant". His
analyses of the Indonesian
economy included a core section
onagriculturaldevelopments.He
states that the New Order (Orde
Baru) regime has been successful
increatingruraldevelopment and
improving rural people's
livelihoods. However, he
overlooked that the attention of
the Orde Baru regime for rural
areas has been declining. Till the
beginning of the nineties, rural
Indonesiahashadrelativelymuch
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attention from the government.
Thismattermaterialisedinaseries
of rural development programs
liketireGreenRevolutionpolicies,
the Colt Revolution, road
construction projects, electricity,
and the development of a small-
scale industry.Thiscreatedarapid
agricultural development, and
alsoputastrainonemployment.5
While agricultural production
increased, inequality grew,
employment for landlessvillagers
decreasedandagrowingnumber
of youngvillagersstartedtowork
in the cities. Another effect of all
these developments was that
villages started to become less
isolated and partly urbanised.
Many rural areas inJava started
to look like desa kota or rurban
regions (McGee, et. al., 1997) and
urbanandruraleconomiesstarted
to merge. Therefore, when
urbanisedJava got affectedbythe
severe crisis of 1997/98, rural
areaswerebasicallyaffectedalike
and at the same time. Even in
remote rural areas
—
inside and
outside Java— the crisis was felt
forcefully.
For this article, it is important
to note the effects of the crisis on
the poor in these rural areas.
Contrarytosomeexpectations,the
poor are affected most by the
crisis. Levinsohn et. al. (1999) for
instance state in a recent paper
about the 97/98 crisis: "We find
that thepoorhaveindeedbeenhit
hardest. Just how hard the poor
have been hit, though, depends
crucially onwhere the household
lives,whether thehousehold isin
ruralor urbanarea, andjust how
the cost of living index is
computed.What isclear isthat the
notion that the very poor are so
poor as to be insulated form
international shocks is simply
wrong. Rather, inthe Indonesian
case, the very poor appear the
mostvulnerable." As we focus on
the rural poor in this paper,
poverty studies like that of
Levinsohnet.al.areinterestingbut
sometimes raise more questions
thananswers.Thepresentationof
quantitative data alone does not
tellusmuchabout the natureand
experience of poverty. We found
in our research for instance that
accordingtopovertydefinitionsof
localpeople,theverypoorarenot
thosevillagerswholacksufficient
income,but thosewhoarenotable
to takeplaceintheritualexchange
economy of villagers anymore.
Added to this, structural
categories of poor are those who
are kasihan (pitiful) like widows
without help and/or oldwithout
5 As for instancehasbeenreportedabout the GreenRevolution(Collier,1981;
Hart,et. al., 1989) [Husken,1989;Wiradi, 1984;White, 1989].
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children or without being cared
for. In order to understand the
dynamicsofpoverty,we therefore
need a more differentiated and
dynamic approach. Mostpoverty
studies donottelluswho thepoor
are and why they are poor.
Therefore, we make inthis article
a combination of poverty studies
andmoredynamicstudiesdealing
with vulnerable poor like social
security studies.
Most poverty studies, like
those of for instance the World
Bank,arequitestatic.Definitions,
likeapoverty lineof one dollar a
day, do not make muchsense on
the locallevelandinasituationof
arapiddevaluationof thenational
currency.SingarimbunandPenny
{1973) was among the first
Indonesians to do poverty
researchinIndonesiaand tried to
dealwiththeproblemof inflation
by using rice as a definition of
poverty. According to him, the
very poor are those with incomes
less than 240 kg rice equivalent/
capita/year andthepoorare those
whohaveanincomeless than320
kgof rice.Hisdefinition,although
an improvement at that time,
remains rather static and income
oriented. A social security
approachmigihthelp to solve this
problem.Inour opinion, the crux
of thematter inpoverty isthe lack
of access to resources. F. and K.
von Benda-Beckmann state:
"poverty or wealth refers to the
economic conditionmeasuredby
lack of ownership or command
over resources and monetary
incomes. Social security refers to
the conversion of resources into
actually (un)fulfilled social
securityneeds"(Benda-Beckmann
and Benda-Beckmann, 1994).
Socialsecurity studies arebroader
and more dynamic than poverty
studies inthesense that theystudy
not only the materialpossessions
of people, but their socially
secured (potential) access to
resources too. Amartya Sen, who
did many poverty studies did
somethingsimilar indealingwith
the limitations of poverty studies
by introducing the concept of
entitlements (Sen, 1977,1992).He
states that it is not the actual
positionofmaterialwealthwhich
makes people poor, but the lack
entitlements to resources. Added
to this,we think it is important to
lookat the relationaldimensionof
poverty. As indicated by local
people,social isolationfor themis
the utmost problem of poverty
(Townsend,1993).Isolatedpeople
have less access to information,
power, labour opportunities,
networks,andsystems ofsupport
andredistributionwhichhavethe
potential of offering (some)
security. Being poor (having no
possessions), lacking access to
resources and being excluded
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from redistribution mechanisms
as social security arrangements
makes people much more
vulnerable for economic crises.
These aspects of poverty and
vulnerability are at the centre of
our analysis in this article, which
deals with the effects of the crisis
inIndonesia.
Government Policies
At the beginningof the crisis,
thegovernment was veryhesitant
to take action. They still seemed
tobelievethat theruralareaswere
not affected and could cope with
the difficulties. Soeharto said on
televisionafew monthsbeforehis
fall that the crisis would soonbe
over. ("Badai pasti berlalu"; "The
storm will soon be over",).
Governmental responses on the
crisis were not effective and did
havenothingtodowiththecauses
of thecrisis.As for instancethecall
to Cinta Rupiah (love your own
currency), to give gold for
strengthening the currency,
distribute rice packages (nasi
bungkus) and the publicexchange
of US dollars for Rupiah by
government and rich people. In
Augustus 1998, when the crisis
continued and its severe effects
could no longer be neglected,
Social Safety Net programs (JPS
Jaring Pengaman Sosial) became
effective. These programs were
designed to lessen the negative
social effects of the crisis. Among
theseprogramswere:l) Programs
for enhancingfoodsecurity (cheap
rice, subsidies for sembako,
increased Bulog interventions,
etc.), 2) employment creation
programs, 3) credit support
programs for small and medium
enterprises, 4) social protection
programs for education and
health.Inthenextsections,wewill
describe indetail for Sriharjo and
Krajanwhat theeffects of thecrisis
were for different groupsandhow
effective these policies in the
villages were.
2 The Crisis inSriharjo,
CentralJava
a. Typicality's of Sriharjo's
Economy
Sriharjo lies at the foot of the
limestonehills(PegununganSewu)
that start from the Indian Ocean
at South CentralJava. It issited a
25kilometresSouthofYogyakarta
ontheroadtoGunungKidulclose
to the Imogiri cemeteries where
the Sultans of Yogyakarta have
been buried for centuries. Desa
Sriharjo consists of a fertile
lowland part with irrigated rice
fields and a barren upland part.
The village population counts
around9300 inhabitantsscattered
over 13 hamlets. The limestone
hills make up 60 per cent of the
village area and host 30 per cent
of the population.The lower part
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consists of 40 per cent of the total
area with 70 per cent of the
population.Thehillypartismuch
moreisolatedandpoorer thanthe
lower part. Their inhabitants are
usuallyreferredtoaswonggunung
(mountain people) which has the
negative connotation of being
backward, uneducated and
traditional, while the inhabitants
of thelowerpartare referredtoas
wong ngare (lowland people)
which has a very positive
meaning.
The higher part of Sriharjo
produces cassava, maize, and
somebananasfor subsistence,teak
wood, some chilly, and other
vegetables for the local and
regional market. The irrigated
lowlandpartproducesrice,maize,
soybean, and vegetables for the
market.
As inallotherpartsof lowland
Java, transport facilities of lower
Sriharjoarevery good.Becauseof
thismanyvillagerstravelbackand
forth their work in Yogyakarta
every day. Where as most of the
wonggunungbybike,mostof the
wong ngare by motorcycle.
Contrary to tire early New Order
pears (1969), when all villagers
worked in rural areas and were
poor (seeSingarimbunandPenny,
1973), nowadays the majority of
the villagers derive their main
incomefromthecityandarebetter
off. Then is, however, still much
poverty inSriharjo.
In1969-1970,Singarimbunand
Penny studied the widespread
povertyinSriharjo,andpublished
the first Indonesianbook on this
subject (Singarimbun and Penny,
1973).Fromthat time on, the rural
development programs which
were implemented by The New
Order started to increase the
economic conditions inruralJava
and therefore, poverty started to
decline slowly. A restudy
conductedbySingarimbunin1989
(Singarimbun, 1996) showed that
poverty (income less than 320 kg
rice/capita/year) declined from
70 per cent in1969 to 42 per cent
in 1989. But in crisis time (1998)
70 per cent of the villagers were
poor. It is a possible explanation
of this growthis that inthesamea
periodof twentyyears incomeout
ofnon-farmingactivitiesrosefrom
16 per cent to 69 per cent. The
contribution of the agricultural
sector to average household
incomesfellsubsequently from84
per cent to 31per cent.
The number of village people
havingaccess to land declined in
the last thirty years accordingly.
The percentage of villagers with
little or no land rose from 49 per
cent to 76 per cent and the
percentage of villagers who have
nolandatallrosefrom37percent
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Table 1.
Distribution of Sawah in Lower Srihaijo (Hamlet Miri)
Sawah (hectare) 1969 1989 1999
No land 37 48 53
0,001-0,050 13 16 23
0,051-0,100 17 13 14
0,101-0,200 17 13 6
Sub total 83% 90% 96%
0,021-0,400 11 6 3
0,401-0,800 4 4 1
0,801-more 2 - -
N 101 100 167
Source: 1969 & 1989: from Singarimbun, 1993
1999: from data survey 1999.
to 53 per cent.6 Villagers did not
sell their land, but children of
smallholders were not able to
inherit or buy anything. As
employment in agriculture
decreased also, most of the
villagers nowadays have lost
access to land.This process lies at
the basis of the increased
migrationto the bigcities and the
increasedimportanceof non-farm
activities for village livelihood.
ThepoorpeopleofSrihaijocan
be found among those who have
no access to land and who lack
sufficient economic and social
capital. But the really poor are
those categories of people who
lack sufficient networks of family
members as well. As widows,
widows/widowers without
children or with very small
children, old people without
children and handicapped. Or
thosewhoarenotable togetaccess
to other sources of income like:
agricultural labourer, harvest
labourer, becak driver, construc¬
tion worker, etc. But, if these
categories of people don't have
6 ThisphenomenonmeetstheexpectationasdescribedbyHayamiandKikuchi
that by agricultural modernisation increasing numbers of the rural
populationswill lose access to land (see Hayamiand Kikuchi, 1981).
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access to income, they still canbe
relativelywelloff if theyarecared
for by more affluent relatives or
village members. Very often,
social relations make the
difference between the rich and
the poor.
Contrary to the past, not the
full-time farmers are the well off
people of Sriharjo anymore, but
those who combine fanning with
non-farming activities, like
teachers, army officials, traders,
and civilservants.
b. Perceptionsof the Crisis
At the beginningof the crisis,
villagers constantlychattedabout
the crisis. For example, during
arisan (rotatingsavinggroups),at
village meetings and at the ronda
(night watch) the topic and its
causes was discussed over and
over again. Villagers did not
understandwhere krismon7 came
fromandtheysaw itas thesource
of all their problems in life. Like
the loss of their job as a
constructionsandfabric worker in
the cities, like budgetary
problems, rising prices of basic
needs,the priceof food, the rising
prices of pesticides and fertiliser
etc. In these discussions many
different views concerning the
crisis were expressed. According
to some villagers, the eventswere
severe, but according to others,
they were easy to overcome. In
general,villagers' opinionsvaried
according to socio-economic and
demographic factors such as
status, occupation, age, and
gender. Young people perceived
krismon as a serious crisis, while
on the contrary, the older
generationperceivedthe crises as
a normal condition of rural life.
According to the older villagers a
crisis isarealfaminewhennofood
of good quality is available. The
oldgenerationsaw the 1998crisis
only as little turmoil, as basic
needswerestillavailablealthough
expensive.Therefore, they regard
the crisis in1998only as anormal
condition of village life. In their
lives, they hadbeenhit by worse
crises before. For them, the
availability of food is the main
indicator for a crisis.Inthe 1930's,
during the world economic crisis
(villagers call this the missed era,
jaman meleset,)8 they suffered so
badly from famine that they ate
the skin of cassava, the roots of
banana threes and grassroots.
During the Japanese occupation,
7 For tirevillagerskrismonmeansthat they lost their job asa constructionworker
and fabric worker inthe cities and also the rose of the price of gods and the
agriculture intake ie.pestiside, fertilizer, etc.
8 The meaning of meleset probably originates from the Dutch word malaise,
which means misery,but meleset inJavanese means missed.
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people suffered even more and
died of starvation. During the
revolutionary years of 1945-1950,
food availability was limited. At
the end of the Old Order or the
beginning of the New Order
(1965), the most recent crisis
occurred. That one is still
perceived as being much worse
than the 1998 one. The younger
generation however, who has
never suffered form any crisis or
famine before, regards this crisis
as very bad. For the younger
generations not only the lack of
good food means crisis, but the
decline of other consumption
goods
—
cigarettes,sweetsetc
—
as
well.
Thesocio-economic status also
influences the view on the nature
of the crisis. Middle to upper
classes realisedthey stillcoulddo
quite well. For the lower classes,
itwas veryhardtoaccept that they
had to economise on the quality
and the quantity of food. In
contrast to the lower classes, the
middle and upper class seemed
however more worried about the
crisis. Although they were less
affected, the middle and higher
classes tended to discuss much
more about the crisis. The lower
classeshowever,were moresilent
andoftenseemed to think itbeing
less important to express their
demands.9
Betweenmenandwomenalso
differentperspectivesonthe crisis
exist. In general, women,
encountered,went through ...etc.
more difficulties duringthe crisis
andtherefore,their perceptionson
the crisis differ from men's. But
this does not count for women
with an independent income.For
instance, households where the
woman was making embroidery
did better than those
—
under
same conditions
—
who was not.
c. Effects of the Crisis on
Villagers and their
Responses
The crisis caused most
difficulties for the poorer people
of Sriharjo. But also for those
peoplewho depend only onnon-
farm activities, the crisis turned
out to be a major setback as well.
At the beginning of the crisis,
nearlyallconstructionwork inthe
cities stopped, many factories
went bankrupt and work
opportunitiesdecreasedseverely.
9 They often put it themselves this way: "kami harus/selalu hidup prihatin. We
must/have to accept our fate. We have to runa very simple life. Prihatin:
eating less, sleeping less, demanding less. We have to be tough and patient
and entrust our lives to God's mercy".But these statements generate more
questionsthananswers.There isaneedfor ananalysisof thereasons,culture
and mechanisms behind these statements.
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Those who worked in the cities
suddenly lost their source of
income and some of them return
to the village. At the beginningof
the crisis, more than 100 people
who worked in the industries of
Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta in
came back to Sriharjo. Only,
around 10 per cent of them were
female. Most women worked as
domestic helpers or in the textile
industrydidnot losetheir jobs. In
general, domestic servants were
not fired after the crisis and those
working in the textile industry
were protected by one of
managers who originated from
Sriharjo. Therefore, most of the
women who migrated to did not
return. Also, more than 200
villagers who worked as
construction workers and becak
drivers inandaroundYogyakarta
and were travelling to and forth
Sriharjo everyday, lost their job
and didn't go to Yogyakarta
anymore.Somevillagers,who lost
their jobs in the cities, were not
coming back to the village, but
found other work. In general
migrants returnedto the village if
they could not do anything else.
At first these returnees from the
bigcitieswerenotso obvious and
seemed not at ease in the village.
They at first did not engage in
many activities inthe village,but
after some weeks, they started to
assist with any kindof work, like
cutting grass, wage labouring,
fishing, making embroidery, and
trading birds. Some time later,
mostof themstarted to go back to
the cities again and found some
kindof a job. For the commuters,
those who stayed at home, the
situation was different. They
straightaway took up whatever
work available in the village
becausetheywere alreadyusedto
combineruralactivitieswiththeir
urban work. Both groups
constantly triedtoget information
aboutjob possibilitiesfromfriends
and relatives and some of them
indeedgot a newjob soon. Those
who had established good
networks of social relationships
were more successful than those
who were operating more
individually. The lower class
constructionworkers for instance,
who usedto work for abrokergot
quicker work again than skilled
construction workers operating
individually.Somehowever,who
had difficulties finding a similar
job like they had before were
forced tochangefromurbanwork
toruralwork (buruhsrabutan) and
turned for instance to cut
sugarcane, milkingcows, cutting
grass, etc. This meant a real drop
instatus,andreturns fromlabour
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were not even sufficient for
feeding a family.10 To survive,
they were forced to change their
way of livetotally.They started to
mix rice with tiwul (low quality
food made from dried cassava)
and ate this without any side dish
like tempe, tahu, fish or egg. They
stopped using sugar for tea,
changed tocheap-sometimesself-
made- cigarettes, and could use
only a little bit cheap of cooking
oil.
The fate of the already poor
villagers like widows e.g. was
evenworse.At normaltimes, their
lives had already been full of
difficulties, and the crisis only
addedto this.Likefor instancethe
case of bu Ngadinem, a widow
with two small children:
Bu Ngadinem looks like a
fifty years old woman, but
she didnotyet reachher for¬
ties. Herhusbanddiedseven
years ago because of pneu¬
monia. She works herself as
a rurallabourer whenat one
day Isaw her crying in the
waning (smallshop) because
she could not pay her debts
to the shop owner and had
toborrowmoretobuyfood.
At that moment she already
had a debt of Rp25,000.00.
Shewantedtobuysalt,some
spices, lampoilandakiloof
rice to mix with tiwul (cas¬
sava). She had to buy rice,
because her children could
not stand to eat only tiivul.
She asked the other people
present if they knew an or¬
phanage for her children.
"Instead of starvation, it is
better Isend them to an or¬
phanage", she said. After a
few months, indeed, one
child entered an orphanage
inYogyakarta.
Also less poor families
experienced problems with food
for their children. Most children
had never eaten tiwul dried
cassava and were crying if they
had to eat that. Added to this,
there were also other minor
complaints of children about the
food, like stomach problems,
abouthungry feelings (as cassava
doesnotgiveafull feeling) and the
bad smell of cheap rice. Another
widow said: "anak-anak saya
sekarang tidak pernah dapat uang
jajan" (My children nowadays
never get money to buy snacks).
In one hamlet, the villagers
complained to the head of the
hamlet about the peddlers who
were selling small snacks like ice
andbakso. Everytimethepeddlers
entered the village, children
10 The average wage for this kindof work was Rp4,000.00 for a longworking
day excludingbreakfastor lunch.The priceof ricewas morethanRp3,000.00
per kilogram.
37
PandeMadeKutancgaraandGerben Nooteboom
startedtocryandtobegfor money
to buy a snack. To lessen the
economic pressureofhisfamilies,
the head of the hamlet forbid the
peddlers to enter the hamlet
everyday. Since then, they were
only allowed to enter the hamlet
two times a week.
Another difficulty for poor
people during the crisis was
meeting the expectations of
exchanging gifts (sumbangan) at
funeralsandweddings.Theywere
afraid to slop giving these gifts in
fear of social exclusion, of gossip
and of being called greedy or a-
social. They tried in all possible
ways to grasp money to maintain
the ritual exchange networks of
society at large.
During the crisis, some
villagers who hadgood access to
resources like land, cattle and
other resources were able to
improve their position. People
who earned a salary out of
agriculture and combined this
with income out of non-farm
activities benefited most. One
household for instance, which
runs a warung and also rents half
a hectare sawah became rich
becauseof risingpaddypricesand
an increased income out of the
waning. At the beginning of the
crisis, tireprofitout of the waning
was very high,because they sold
stocks thatwereboughtatamuch
lower pricebefore the crisis. Due
tothecrisis theycouldrebuilt their
houses and buy some furniture
likeasofa,gas stove,etc.Villagers
inhigher areasofSriharjowhohad
cattle benefited also from the
rising prices by selling some of
their cows to buy a second hand
motor cycle.More than20 people
soldcattiesandmanymotorcycles
entered the village. These
motorcycleswerenotonlybought
for working outside Sriharjo but
also for the social status attached
tohavingone.
The impact of the crisis is also
regionally differentiated and
differs in several parts of the
village. In the higher part of
Sriharjo, which is more isolated,
subsistenceorientedandpoor,the
peopledidnotpaymoreattention
to the crisis than those who lived
elsewhere although they were
harderhit.Inthat time, they tried
tosuffice their basicneeds (simple
food only). They more easily
changedtheir consumptionto the
low quality food (tiwul). The
opposite took place in Miri, the
lower part of Sriharjo, which is
more open and market oriented.
Thepeople there paidmuchmore
attention to the crisis in daily
conversations because they hada
lotmoreexpenses andneeds like,
electricitybills,education,health,
etc. and complained all the time
althoughmanywerehitlesshard.
Ifpeoplearetalkingalotaboutthe
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crisis that does not indicate
anything about beingaffected by
thecrisis.Thepeoplefromthehilly
part had never been able to get
access to good health care and
education and yet adapted more
quietly.
d. The Role of the (Local)
Government inFightingthe
Crisis
Did the local government
(villageheadsandvillageofficials)
give good notice to the crisis?
When I asked government
employees during the crisis in
1998about what they didabout it,
they answered: "The crisis is not
sosevere inthevillages compared
to the situationinthe cities.Pitiful
are those who cannot eat in the
cities. For us here in the villages
thesituationisreasonable.Wecan
still pick leaves freely for adding
to our food". They also reported
inthesewords about the situation
in the village to the regional
government officials. They
believed themselves to a certain
extent that in their own villages
not many people were affected.
The neglect of the problems in
their own villages has three
reasons: 1) local village officials
don't know much about poor
peopleintheir ownvillages.They
hardly ever meet them, and
poverty in Java is relatively
invisible.2) Theywere influenced
by dominant discourses in the
media and higher government
echelons that depicted only the
severe situation in the cities. 3)
Local village officials in general
are more oriented to serve the
higher levels of the government
than to serve villagers. Becauseof
this, they were very busy with
carrying out government
programs and instructions from
above and therefore were not
capable totacklespecificproblems
and needs of villagers. The local
villageofficials thereforedidn'tdo
much to enhance the living
conditions of the localpoor.They
never proposed new ideas or
programs, and the government
programs that were employed in
fact more benefited the rural
middleclass,not thepoorestof the
poor.
During the crisis, It seemed
that the localgovernment didnot
pay much attention to the crisis.
They just carried on with the
routine jobs as being part of tire
lowest bureaucracy system in
Indonesia.Infact, they werebusy
indeedwiththeroutineprograms
and in assisting the higher level
officials (kecamatanandkabupaten).
Buttherefore,theycouldnotfocus
onthevillageproblems.Theoffice
of the village head (kantor
kelurahan) was visited every day
bygovernmentguestswhoallhad
tocarryoutimportantthings.And
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of course, the lowest levelofficials
were ready to serve their higher
officials.But it took monthsbefore
something was done about the
impact of the crisis, whereas the
localgovernmentdidnot takeany
initiatives. The crisis made
painfully clear that the local
government turned out to be an
administrative unit instead of
havinga governing function.
Duringthe crisis, the village of
Sriharjo receivedseveral forms of
aid to fight the impacts of crisis.
Thishelpwas ratherunorganised.
Before the program from the
governmentcame, thevillagehad
already received help from non¬
government sources, like from
religious institutions, private
sector initiatives,the RedCross of
Singapore, etc. This support was
distributed on the basis of three
different sets of data about the
needy. Sometimes data from the
village office were used,
sometimes data from BKKBN
(familyplanning),andsometimes
from the Department of Social
Welfare. Sometimesevena region
was selectedand only villagers of
one hamlet got all the help both
letting poor and rich members
benefit. Poor people living in a
richer region did not benefit.
Unclear andunreliabledatawere
the main reason for the many
problemsrelatedtohelpprograms
in the village. But also dormant
and hidden conflicts, hierarchies
and competitions between
villagers came painfully to the
fore. People started to be jealous
to others from different hamlets,
from different classes and
especially within families and
neighbourhoods. Youngsters
organised three demonstrations in
villages and asked the local
government about the injustice of
the distributionsystem.Becauseof
these demonstrations, the local
government decided to divide the
helpequallyover allfamilies,both
poor and rich villagers got help.
In this way, help only meant for
thepoor,was transferredpartly to
the richer echelons of society.
Besidesdemonstrations the aid
ledtosome funny experiences.For
instance, help from Singapore
contained some luxury food like
creamer, spaghetti sauce with
spaghetti and some canned food.
The villagers hadnever seen that
food and were confused. Like the
family of Pak Jeno, a poor
household.They receivedonebox
of food, and tried to cook it and
they mixed everything together,
but, in the end, never succeeded
to eat that food.
Later, the government offered
cheap rice (sembako) for poor
villagers at RplO,000.00 per 10
kg's. The village of Sriharjo
received613 packetsamonthand
mostof that aidwas meant for the
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hilly part of Sriharjo. That was a
good idea, because in that part
livedmostof thepoorhouseholds.
But,theheadofhamletdistributed
that aid not only to the poorer
households,but every household
got a share of it.Eventually,every
household received around 7
kilogram a month. The local
government legitimised their
decisionbystatingthat they were
afraid of conflicts inthe village.
A small amount of the cheap
ricewas distributed inlower part
of Sriharjo. Since access to non-
farmactivities inthat area ismore
open, there are not many poor
households. During the crisis
however, most of them were
affected. Nevertheless, they did
not receive aid from the
government, as they were not
registered as poor households in
the pre-crisis situation.
Inshort,inthebeginningof the
crisis,programswere moreabout
food (sembako) but later on, also
other elements were included,like
health, work and income
generatingactivities.Totalhelp to
Sriharjo, exceeded 200 million
Rupiah, for several programs.
Since the village administration
had never received so much
moneybefore,oneof the headsof
the hamlets said that he did not
understand that so much money
was cominginto the village for he
couldnotspent it.Hegotconfused
because he had not received
informationabout aclearprogram
with clear criteria. Some villagers
expressed the feeling that the
government wasted a lot of
money, and misuse of funds by
lower government officials
became indeedpossible.
3. The Crisis inKrajan,East
Java
a. Typicality of Krajan's
Economy
ThevillageofKrajanliesonthe
slope of mountainArgopuro at a
distance of 20 kilometres from
Bondowoso town, East Java. The
village has always been much
more isolated than Sriharjo until
recently the village roadhasbeen
improved and irregular daily
transport toBondowosoor Besuki
is available. Nevertheless,Krajan
is located far from the bigurban
centres inJava. The first middle-
sized city is Jember at a 60
kilometres distance and little
villagers have ever been there.
Krajan has around 3400
inhabitants of whom the majority
is poor and engages mainly in
subsistence farming. As Krajanis
situatedontheNorthEastof Java,
the populationis fully Madurese.
The village has been founded
before 1850,longbefore the main
Madurese migration waves to
East-Javastartedinthebeginning
20th century.
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Desa Krajan lies at an altitude
between800 and 1,100meter and
the terrain ishilly.The red ladang
soils inthe village are washed out
and less fertile thanmost of those
in rural Java, but they are more
fertile than the limestone soils of
higherSriharjo.The few saioahs of
Krajan however, are of much
lower quality than those of Miri,
lower Sriharjo. In the long dry
season,nocropscanbeplantedat
allas theirrigationislimited.After
the first rains,maize,rice,cassava
and some vegetables are planted.
These crops are mainly for
subsistence purposes and are
hardly commercialised and
monelarised. After the harvest of
maize, as a second (cash) crop,
many farmers plant tobacco (for
the domestic market). Due to the
shortageof rain,thepoorsoils,tire
limited use of technology, inputs
andknowledge,theproductionof
crops are relatively lowinKrajan.
Due to these less favourable
agricultural conditions, Krajan is
—
like Sriharjo
—
a village with a
low agriculturalproductionbase.
Only lower Sriharjo (Miri) has
fertile sawah, but even there, rice
productions are a bit lower
because of problematic access to
irrigation in the dry season.
Therefore, both villages did not
profit much from the positive
effectsof the crisis onagricultural
production and export related
crops.InKrajanonly afew farmers
(less than one per cent) own
enoughlandto sell riceor cornon
the market. Although Krajan is
rich in cattle, most farmers who
soldcowsneededtheprofitdearly
to buy rice, maize, or to pay off
debts. The only other important
non-agriculture based source of
income is the making of besek
(smallbamboo baskets). Incomes
out of the besek,however,are low
and decreased during the crisis.
Contrary to Sriharjo, migration
ratesare low11 and therefore,cash
inflows from outside are not
significant. Added to the weak
productionbase of Krajan, is the
insecurity in crop output. The
harvests in dry land agriculture,
aremorefluctuating then those in
irrigated agriculture. Farmers
therefore are used to deal with
fluctuations inincomeandfollow
risk avoiding and investment
extensive agricultural strategies.
InKrajan, where irrigated plots
are scarce, erratic rainfall, poor
soils and tobacco productionadd
to fluctuations in income. To a
certain extent,people are used to
these insecurities. But in Krajan
this did not —contrary to the
11 Less than 5% of the populationhas a family member working somewhere
else
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expectation (Wolters12)— lead to
collective village-wide arrange¬
ments to cover the risksof income
fluctuation (Wolters,1998).Oneof
the conclusions of the research is
that the insurance against these
risks takes place individuallyand
of the household level. Insurance
against income fluctuations takes
place by the means of saving (in
gold, cows, and
—
to a certain
extent— social relations), by
avoiding and spreading risks,by
agricultural diversification
(combiningdifferent cropsandby
the growingof subsistencecrops),
and by occupational pluralisms
(the combination of different
sources of income). Incontrast to
Sriharjo, the possessionof landas
production factors is very
important in Krajan, where land
has more and more a status
function.Another differenceisthe
rate of villagers having access to
land.Landownership inKrajanis
slightly less unequal than in
Sriharjo, but generally this
conditionasunequalas anywhere
in rural Java (Hart, et. al., 1989;
Hefner, 1990; Husken, 1989). In
Krajan around 75 per cent of the
villagers at leasthavesome access
to land, either by ownership,
shared tenancy arrangements or
by other forms of labour
arrangements.Theonlycashcrop,
tobacco, is a main source of
insecurity in itself. Prices are
unstableandtheproductionneeds
quite some inputs. In1997 many
farmers took loans from richer
villagers, the village head, and a
cheap credit programs for the
tobacco production. Usually this
borrowing takes place at rates of
50 per cent for 6 months, and
manywentbankrupt.13 due to low
tobacco pricesandthe lowquality
of it affected by the prolonged
rains. Eventhrough, the price of
tobaccohasbeenrisingduringthe
crisis, the real price of tobacco
declined.14 Profits declined while
productioncostsrose.Thisprocess
in fact took already place several
years before the crisis, but then
accelerated dramatically leading
many farmers to bankruptcy. A
significant number (50) of these
bankrupt farmers fled to
Kalimantaninthehopeto finding
work and money to cover their
financial problems. Others were
forced to sell, pawn, or rent out
cows or land to cover their debts.
Most of the migrants to
Kalimantan
—
also those who
were not debt-driven
—
did not
succeed and came back poorer
12 Personal communication. Compare Plateau, (Plateau, 1991).
13 WithbankruptcyImeantechnically bankrupt;notbeingable to repaydebts.
14 The real price declined from ten kilo rice equivalent for one kilo tobacco to
less than 3 kilo's to one inthe course of five years.
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thanwhenthey left.Becauseof the
crisisandrisingpricesof transport
some could never succeeded to
come back at all.
b. Effects cf the Crisis on the
Villagers and their
Responses
According to the villagers, life
hadneverbeeneasybefore.From
time to time,they face insecurities
inaccess to income and food due
to lifecycle crises, bad harvests,
andfluctuatingincomes.Added to
tliis, a number of wider regional,
economic andnationalcriseshave
hadanimpact inthe village.From
the beginning of the 20th century
onwards, the people of Krajan
have experienced six major
economic crises. 1)Thecrisisof the
thirties with deflation and
stagnating rural prices,15 2) the
Japanese occupation,3) theDutch
Agressie, and the following
revolutionary years, 4) the
eruption of mount Agung inBali
in 1963 in which ash rains
destroyedmost food crops,5) the
turmoil and inflation around the
end of the Sukarno era, and
eventually 6) the economic crisis
of 1997.
Whereas before the 1997crisis
thevillageeconomy of Krajanwas
for an important part subsistence
oriented, the monetary crisis
affected only parts of the village
economy. Those poor depending
on monetary is adjective never
verbal income sources were
among the hardest hit, like wage
labourers,petty traders andpart-
time carpenters. The domain of
subsistence productionhowever,
stayed mainly untouched and
evenproliferated.16 It'simportant
for the subsistence of villagers to
maintainthe domestic production
of maize, paddy and cassava,
which is consumed by the
household. This includes sub¬
sistence production relations17 as
share cropping arrangements
(with most important babunan18
taking a 1/5share of the harvest
in return for the labouring),
15 See for instance Van der Kolff 1936[?], who describes the impact of the
recession inthe thirties at the village level ina nearby region.The effects of
the 1997crisis show some similarities with the crisis of tire thirties.
16 With this we don't want to argue there issomething as a dual economy on
village level (Boeke, J. H. 1953) On the contrary, the cash oriented and the
non-cash part of the society are highly interrelated. Most villagers make a
living by combining these two and only by this combination are able to
survive.
17 Sometimes called non-capitalist relationsof production (Cf. Hart,G. 1986).
18 ComparewithbawoninJava.As describedby:Breman,Husken,White,Jay....
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exchange labour, rotatinglabour,
and labour for helping out. Only
three per cent of the farmers own
enoughland to sell food crops on
the market.
Onthe local level,the national
crisis was a monetary crisis. The
rising prices —inflation— were
the talk of thedayat thebeginning
of the crisis. In Krajan the crisis
beganto befelt during the month
of Ramadhan (January 1998)19
when villagers started preparing
for IdulFitri, the yearly Muslim's
Celebrationtheendof the fasting.
Every villager experienced the
higher than usual20 prices of rice,
cooking oil, flour, and clothes.
After these months, the prices
continued to increase dra¬
matically. As often during a
sudden rise of prices, villagers
respondedbycuttingbackontheir
consumption.Families,who used
to drink coffee, started to drink
tea.Theoneswhodrank tea drunk
sugar water,andthosewhocould
evennotaffordtobuysugar drank
only plain water. Eggs and
noodles, which were common
foodbeforediecrisis,hadbeencut
hornnearlyallmenusexcept from
dinnersatweddings andfunerals.
And kue, cookies and snacks,
essential for selamatan and for
maintainingsocialrelations,were
lesssweet,andlessabundant than
in the past. New clothes were
hardly bought. At the second
research period (May—August
1999), for some families the lack
of money for new clothes started
to become realproblematic.
One old man said: "Sekarang
makanan sama dengan jaman
Belanda. Kita makan nasi jagung
dengan ikan kering lagi. 53 Tahun
merdeka, tapi tidak ada hasil sama
sekali". (At the moment we eat
similar towhat we didduringthe
Dutch period again. Just rice
mixedwithmaize anddried fish.
53 years of freedom didn't bring
us any advantage at all).
Theseeffectsandresponseson
thecrisismightseemsubtle,butit
meansalotinKrajanifyoucannot
offer coffee to your guests
anymoreorexchangetherequired
snacks and cookies.21 The crisis
meant not only a drop in
consumptionbutwasperceivedas
a drop instatus as well. Further¬
more, only heavy smokers can
understandwhat itmeanstohave
to shift from Gudang Garam, the
19 Fivemonths after the first devaluation of the RupiahinJuly 1997.
20 Every year at X-mas and at the end of the Ramadhan, the prices of
consumption goods are rising.
21 Usually the number of cookies couldbemet,but the quality (usedquantity
and quality of sugar, cookingoil, eggs and flour) decreased significantly.
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good quality filter cigarettes, to
cheap alternatives.22
The effectsof andresponsesto
the crisis by agricultural
producers in Krajan are diverse.
Some farmers reactedto avoiding
risk,others went bankruptandall
of them were facing rising costs
and lower yields. Nevertheless,
some farmers were still able to
makegoodprofitsandsome even
benefited by the crisis. It is
important to distinguishbetween
effects of the crisis and more
generalclimatic effectslikeElNino
(drought)whichhadeffectsonthe
food production arid later on La
Nina (extensiverains)whichwere
disaslrousfor tobaccoproduction.
Effectsof theseclimatic changes in
agriculture had been explicitly
mentioned.
The differentialresponses and
effects onthe 1997crisiswerebeen
partly due the specific
composition were of the farming
activities and due to the unique
characteristics of farm labour
processes itself: "containing a
complex whole of interlinking
tasks,eachwith itsowndegree of
flexibility and particular
procedure [...]Decisions that are
crucial for the end result can be
made only during the labor
process itself. Therein lies the
craftsmanship of farm labor: the
interaction between direct
producer and labor object; i.e. the
continual observation, inter¬
pretation and evaluation of one's
own labor in order to be able to
re-adapt it" (Ploeg, 1990).
In the tobacco season,
following the beginning of the
crisis the area planted with
tobacco in Krajan declined fifty
per cent andmost farmers shifted
from this risky crop to the safer
subsistence crop of maize. Most
farmersworriedsaid andthat they
would not make much profit
because of the rising costs and
preferred to plant corn, rice or
cassava "karenaperutharuskenyang
dulu" (because we have to fillour
stomachs first). Due to the rising
prices of food and labour, many
of richer farmers (who are in
control of 60 per cent of the land
area) were reluctant to use any
paid labour, or even huge
numbers of unpaid labourers.
These labourers still needed
considerable amounts of food,
coffee, and cigarettes to work.
Some farmers, who were used to
grow tobacco on a large scale,
speculated on liigher prices and
borrowed money to produce
tobacco in tire same way as they
were used to do (by using wage
22 Bytheway,nobodyquit smokingbecauseof thecrisis.Accordingtovillagers,
they even increased smoking, karena fusing (because of the stress).
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labourandmanyexternalinputs).
But,most of these went bankrupt
and only some were able to make
some profits, by shifting quickly
to formofnon-paidlabourduring
thegrowingseason.Onlyfarmers,
who were able tomobiliseunpaid
labour,23 hadother sources of cash
income, or were successful in
tobacco trading, succeeded in
makingprofitwith tobacco inthe
summer of 1998. For smaller
numbers of farmers (30
—
40 per
cent of total population), who
could not mobilise much labour
force,only theamountof seedlings
ahouseholdwithcloseneighbours
or friends could master was
planted (with a maximum of 1/
3
—
Vi hectare ladang). They were
able to make some profit because
of their access to labour and the
use of non-commodity labour
arrangements for the production
of commodities (see Ploeg, 1990).
However, this profit was —in
relative terms
—
lower than in
previous years and seldom
enough to make all ends meet.
Added to this,thepricesof inputs
like fertiliser, seedlings and
pesticides24 rose.The impactof the
risingpricesof agriculturalinputs
inKrajanwas muchsmaller than
in Sriharjo because of the minor
roleof inputs initsagriculture.
In 1999, when for the second
time after the start of the crisis
tobacco was planted, little had
changed.Fewvillagersdecidedto
plant cash crops because they
were afraidtoborrowmoneyand
if theyplanted,themthey didthis
withaminimumof inputsleading
to a bad harvest. The heavy and
early rainsat the beginningof the
season, and the total lack of rain
at the end addedto theproblems.
Only a few richer farmers who
plantedcashcropsgothighprofits
because prices of tobacco had
increasedsteeply.
Generally, during the crisis,
making a cash profit in Krajan
agriculturewas onlypossiblewith
the use of non-cash labour and
non-commodity resources. The
economic crisis inKrajan,thus led
to a general withdrawal from the
market, risk avoiding in
agriculture activities andtrading,
and to the cash-shortages in the
village.
c. Effectsof the Crisis onRural
Labour
As the majority of the Krajan
population does not own any
23 These are usually patrons who before the crisis already hada considerable
number of clients tied to them. Orvillagers who were partof rotatinglabour
groups or exchange labour arrangements.
24 Pesticides are hardly used inKrajan.
47
PandeMadeKutanegaraandGerben Nooteboom
land,25 thesepeoplearedepended
on wage labour as their main
source of income.As it described
previously, in Krajan both wage
labourandnon-commodityforms
of labour are important to get
access to land. After the crisis
broke out, the need for wage
labourers had decreased more
than60percentandfor free (non-
tied) wage labourers, the
possibilities of findingpaidwork
nearlydiminished tozero.Onthe
other hand,forms of co-operative
work, as local forms of gotong
royong,exchange labour,rotating
work groups and helping-out
labours increased in importance.
Thevillageeconomyshiftedfrom
semi-subsistence to a highly
subsistenceeconomyagainexcept
for those having access to the
outsideeconomy.
It is important to realise that
rural people make combinations
of different types of work
(occupational pluralism) and in
that way oftenare able to survive
crises. Only few Krajan families
were solely depended on wage
labour.Villagers combined wage
labour (whenever possible)
exchange labour arrangements
and handicraft production at
home. As with the embroidery
makers inSriharjo,many women
inKrajanplayeda crucial role for
the households survival by
earningmoneyathome.InKrajan,
women make sell besek, small
bamboo baskets, and bring them
regionally to Bondowoso and
Jember as containers for the
production of tape (sweet
fermented snack of cassava). In
some hamlets before the crisis,
30
—
40 percentofallwomenwere
periodicallyengagedinthese besek
productions. Women usually
make them incidentally to cover
short periods of cash or food
shortages,inslack periodsduring
the agriculturalcycle or when the
prices of besek arehigh.When the
crisis broke out,nearly allpoorer
villagers made besek the whole
year round. It increased
popularitybecauseitwas theonly
work available, it is easy and
cheap to make, the bamboo is
locallyavailable,ityieldscashand
it offers the opportunity cf small
loans or cash advancements by
traders.Butmoreimportanteven,
25 Idefine landless as those with littleor no land. As nearly all villagers have
userightsofsomeland(thelandwherethehouseisstandingonandagarden
or adjacent plot) Iuse as definitions of landless those categories whose
domesticproductiondoesnotexceedmorethantwomonthsof food (paddy,
maize or cassava) or who do not share a household with those who have
access. Landlessness inKrajanmeansonan average, those families owning
an acreage of sawah less than 0.1ha.and ladang less than 0.2 ha.
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the work canbe done at homeby
the whole family, incombination
with other household activities
such as cooking, fire wood
collection, drying rice or maize,
child care and the like. Increased
household production of besek
enabled villagers to buy rice and
maize and prevented many
villagers from starvation. The
availability of non-agricultural
sourcesof incomewas muchmore
important then the aid programs
of the government incopingwith
the crisis. However, as demands
for tape declined and supply
increased, prices stayed constant
and in context of huge inflation
relatively declined. Before the
crisis in 1997, a day work of one
personmakingbesek was enough
to buy 1.5—1 kg of rice of
reasonable quality, a year later,
only the equivalent of 0.5 to less
than 1kg of low quality rice or
maize couldbe earned. As before
the crisis, the supply of besek was
depending on the price, now the
supply became inflexible and
villagers continued to produce it
even under diminishing returns
because they hadnochoice.
As asideeffect of thecrisisand
the availability of handicrafts,we
found indications that labour
divisions between man and
women had changed. Women in
poorer households are tra¬
ditionallystronginthesubsistence
part of the household, then
became responsible for a steady
cash flow byselling besek as well.
They were in fact much more
successful than men in
guaranteeing subsistence and in
coping with the crisis, therefore
gained a stronger and more
independent position within the
householdand
—
insomecases
—
insociety.
ContrarytoSriharjo,migration
inKrajanisnotmassive.Beforethe
crisis, five to ten per cent of the
householdshada family member
engaged in some kind of
migration.Contrary tothegeneral
picture of Java where rural
villagers migrate to cities,26
migrationout of Krajanismostly
rural-rural.Someof thesevillagers
were searching for work in the
regionof Bondowoso,Besukiand
Madura. Others went to Bali to
work as street peddlersandsome
young women, recruited by
outsiders,went toMalaysia.Only
some of thesemigrantshavebeen
successful and many of them
26 InKrajannomigrationto thebigcitiesofJava (Surabaya,Semarang,Jakarta)
took place. But even Denpasar, Kuta, Jember and Malang did not attract
villagers. Maybe because of the relative isolation of Krajan, or because of
language problems or simply because nobody ever tried and hadreturned
successfully.
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returned without any profit. The
majority of the Krajan migrants
however, followed campaigns of
Dcpnaker (department of labour)
which lured workers for the oil
palmplantations inKalimantan.
When the crisis brokeout,not
many of these migrants returned
toKrajan.Onlysome womenwho
worked in Malaysia returned,
some hadbeen successful, others
not.27 Thosewho usedto go toBali
decided to stay at home after
receiving news that business in
Bali was slack. Many villagers in
Kalimantan didn't wish to come
back, or were trapped because
they could not pay the boat trip
anymore.Only in1999,when GN
returned for the second time in
Krajan, many former wage
labourers had found work inthe
forests ofBanyuwangiandearned
reasonable incomes that they
brought home to buy rice. These
groups of poor were among the
first to recover and turned out to
fall downbelow the poverty line
only temporary.
d. Effects of the Crisis on
Poverty
Like in Sriharjo, those who
haveno access to landexperience
difficulties inliving,butnotallof
themareautomaticallypoor.Only
those who also have no access to
other sources of income are.
Categories as widows,widowers,
widows/widowers without
children or with very small
children, old people without
children and the handicapped
usually makeup the poor, if they
arenotcared for bymoreaffluent
relatives or village members.
Therefore, social exclusion and
isolation are important in
understandingthe realhardsides
of poverty. Relations with other
people are crucial and make the
differencebetweentheneedyand
cared for.The poorer you are, the
more difficult to maintain social
relations like the example of bu
Sahamishows:
Bu Sahami lives in a small
bamboo shed with a roof of
alangalanggrass.Shehasone
bedonwhichshesitsallday
longmakingbesek.Withthat,
she earnsjust enoughtobuy
maize and rice and some¬
times some salt. She never
goes to selamatan, because
shecannotaffordtogivetwo
kilo's of rice. She therefore,
hashardlynocontacts,never
getsvisitors,andtheheadof
27 One of the women was able to bringa lot of ringgit.Two others hadearned
money,but were beaten up by the Malay police and lost their money. One
diedwithin three days after her home coming.
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the hamlet does not even
knowher.
Sheneverbuysoncredit,be¬
cause "then the money
would not be enough for
food" as buyingoncredit is
more expensive. "At first,
when the cheap rice came
(sembako)Ididnotknowit.I
only startedtotakepartsince
the last few months".
She alsocares for her grand¬
daughter of five years old.
Besides that girl, she has no
relatives in the village and
neighboursdonotcareabout
her. Her children left a few
years ago for Kalimantan
andbuSahaminevergotany
news of them. Her main
worry is her slant house of
which she is afraid will col¬
lapse one night and fall
downonher andher grand¬
daughter.
Poorfamilies respondedonthe
crisis inseveral ways. Evenmore
thaninthe past non-cashbenefits
were preferred above cash ones.
One farmer engaged in
sharecropping told GN: "Saya
tidak mau uang tapi beras, karena
rupiah sekarang tidak soma dengan
dulu. Rupiah sekarang kurangkuat,
tidakkuatuntukbeliberas". (Idon't
wantmoneybutrice [formywork,
GN]becausethe Rupiahisnotlike
it used to be. The Rupiah is not
strongtobuyrice anymore).
Very poor villagers could not
do much than cut their coat
accordingto their cloth.They only
once or twice a day, mixed their
rice with bigger shares of maize.
Much depended on where they
got their income from. The far
mostpoor,peoplelikebuSahami
really experienced the pain of
inflation while she really owns
nothingandtherefore totally cash
depended. Those categories are
not themostsubsistenceinsociety,
as they are often excluded and
isolated from any access to local
resources. Others, widows, who
for instance are allowed to clean
the fields from leftovers after
harvesting (a clear example of a
socialsecurityarrangement)could
lessenthepaintosomeextent and
did not experience major
differences as they could not fall
any further livingfor years at the
edge of starvation.
But,were there local arrange¬
mentsandinitiativewhocaredfor
the local poor? Hefner writes
about moral considerations in
caring for weaker members of
society: "The social orientation
emphasizes neither selfless
collectivism nor self-possessed
individualism.Ideallyhouseholds
guarantee itsownsubsistenceand
welfare". And about the moral
village economy: "Its norms are
mostapparentnotinthe realmsof
production, but in consumption
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andexchange [...]It'seffect islife¬
style conformity not selfless
sharing" (Hefner 1990).Isharethe
opinion of Hefner. A major
conclusion is that not much of a
village-wide social safety net
existed. The rule is that villagers
take care of their own social
security.
Incontrast to poor villagers,
richer villagers had not much
difficulty indoingthis,asmanyof
them even benefited from the
crisis or were able to consolidate
their way of living.Among those
who were doing well during the
crisiswerebiglandownersable to
sell rice or corn (less than 5 per
cent of the total population) and
tradersofcattle,chicken,birdsand
tobacco. These richer villagers
howeverwerehitmorebyclimatic
irregularitiesandsubsequentcrop
failure than by the crisis itself. A
major effect of the crisis might
have been that inequalities
betweentherichandthepoorwill
increase again. This time
—
in
contrast to thegreenRevolution—
not by the increase of income by
richer members of society,but by
the fallbackof incomebythepoor
resources.
e. The Roleof the Local
Government Duringthe
Crisis
Thebeginningof the crisis can
becharacterisedbya general lack
of policies,bothonanationaland
regional level. The regional
government that deals with
villageaffairs isthe kecamatanlevel
(district) and the kabupaten
(regency) level. Officials at those
levelshavealwaysonlybeenused
to carry out programs of the
nationalgovernment,butwerenot
very adapted to react on the
differential needs of the local
people. At the beginning of the
crisis, bothnational and regional
governments continued their
normalresponsesupuntillvillage
levels. Itseemed that the national
government had no solutions at
hand and the regional ones
continued to carry out the
ordinaryprogramsandwerebusy
with visits to villages presenting
their usual stories about
development, mutual help and
Pancasila, the five pillars of the
New Order society. An example
of the visit of the Bupati (head of
regency Bondowoso) to Krajan:
Once,duringthe ramadhanof
January 1998 the Bupati
came to Krajan. He opened
thedinner inthehouseof the
village kiai (religious leader)
and prayedwith the village
peopleindiemosque. Inhis
speech,hefocusedonthe re¬
sponsibility of villagers to
makeabetter living,to obey
God and the government
and to keep silent and har¬
monious. According to
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him, the best thing to do in
this timeofeconomicimpair
was to be active ingotong
royong,followingthegovern¬
ment developmental
projects, the tillage of el¬
ephantsgrassandkopt rakyat
(peoplescoffee),usingmod¬
ern inputs as fertiliser, new
varieties of rice, maize and
tobacco. He larded his
speech with humour and
populist references to reli¬
gion and norms to
strengthen his argument.
Unfortunately, most villag¬
ers didnotunderstandhim,
as he spoke highclass Indo¬
nesianandnotMadurese.
Whenthecrisishadcontinued,
governmental officials started to
visit the villages more often. At
first, some funds for small local
projects as alphabetising
programs,PKK,andreforestation
increased.Thanthe funds for these
projects dried up and were not
renewed. The other normal
developmentprogramsonvillage
levels kept running. As Krajan is
an IDT-village (inpres desa
tertinggal (literary a backward
village)) the village is entitled to
special developmental projects.
Thishasimplicationsfor diefunds
available for the village
cooperative (KUD), the IDT
projectsasroadbuilding,poverty
alleviation, etc. and for cheap
credit (KUT) programs. These
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programsjust kept on runningas
they were before except that the
IDTprogramswere terminated.
Only at aroundApril 1998the
first special programs started to
help the poor who were no aid
longer able tobuyfoodstuffs.The
government, army and private
donors (Muslims,Christians and
Chinese) started to supply basic
needs as rice,cookingoilandsalt
to the rural poor. These
—
often
spontaneous
—
aid campaigns,
locally simply calledsembako, can
be characterised by a lot of
showing off, little organisation,
and a lack of reliable old (pre-
crisis) data.Thedecisionofwhom
was entitled to helpwas decided
by the village leader and his
officials, but not based on dear
criteria.OftenIwitnessed that the
most needy did not get while
others close to village offirials
were able to secure one or more
than one package. More remote
hamlets of Krajan often got less
helpthanthosenearby.Thiswhole
campaignof spontaneoussembako
aid was more symbolical than
really effective. Krajan received
five times around 150 packages,
while the needy made up much
more. More significant sembako
help was given later (starting in
October 1998),when the govern¬
mentsentcheapriceonamonthly
basis (Rpl,000.00 per kg). In the
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case of Krajan, this meant that 12
tons served a populationof 3,400
villagers.This not only decreased
the ricepricesinthevillagebut led
a dozen small waning to the edge
ofbankruptcyas these smallshop
owners were dependent on the
selling of rice.The amount of rice
was so huge (3.5 kg per head of
the populationper month),that it
was sometimes hard to find
enough buyers for tire rice. The
villageheadandlaterhissecretary
were selling some of the rice
illegally back to town for market
prices. Nevertheless what went
wrong, for those poor who were
shocked by the sudden fall of
purchasepowerwereveryhelped
by it. Many poor villagers were
prevented for starvation in this
way. Unfortunately, the utmost
poor had no access to this
program. Even Rp10,000.00 was
too muchfor them as poorpeople
have no access to income and
credit. Only after some time they
were offered loans from the main
shop owner of the village - the
mother of the village head- who
asked 60 per cent of the received
rice inreturnwhat she sold with
profit in her shop. The village
middle class were mainly
profiting from this program
including that quite some of this
rice disappeared in the dis¬
tributingprocess.Inneighbouring
villages, the amount of rice was
always five till tenper cent lower
than promised. Government
officers at the district level sold
this ricepercent "tocover thecosts
of theextrawork" as theyjustified
it.As with most other village aid
projects, lower government
employeesbenefitedfromthis aid
programs. The cheap credit
programs (KUT) were extended
greatly for the plantingseason of
1998/99. Little farmers became
available for local farmers and
most of the funds (more than 150
millionKupiah'swere usedbythe
villageheadfor hisownprojects).
This crisis made clear that the
Indonesiangovernment has been
more often a source of insecurity
than a provider of social safety
duringthe crisis. Other aspects of
the JPS (social safely net
programs) hardly reachedKrajan
and Iwas not in the position to
study what happened with the
fundsavailable for theseprograms
at the district and regency level,
but was able to notice that no
significant programs to increase
work,educationor access tohealth
were carriedoutonavillage level.
In general, poorer villagers
benefitedmost fromthesubsidies
on the nine strategic basic needs
which kept prices as low as
possible, from the cheap rice
program and from their specific
village economy who offered
manyopportunities to returnto a
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subsistence.Moreimportant than
all, the programs of the govern¬
ment was the home industry of
makingbesekwhoofferedtherural
poor a way to survive and to
generate income next to their
subsistence sources.
Comparisonand Conclusions
A close comparison of these
twovillagesshowsthat theimpact
of the crisis has been substantial
inboth villages. Both Harmoko
and Jellinek were too quick in
sayingthat the impact inthe rural
areas was not severe. Jellinek's
quickstudywasbasedonresearch
in few villages with small-scale
enterprises and therefore a
stronger productionbasethanthe
villages of Sriharjo and Krajan.
Her conclusion might be
applicable for villageswithstrong
resource bases.28 If looking at
villages like Sriharjo and Krajan,
it canbe concluded that the crisis
hashit the ruralareas asstrongas
itdidthecitiesandmorepainfully,
especially the poor in these
villages were among the hardest
hit. The comparison of Sriharjo
and Krajan in this article shows
that it is not very useful to judge
the effects of the crisis in broad
dichotomies as rural -urban, or
poor- rich, but a more differen¬
tiated approach is needed.
Therefore, inour article we offer
an insight view of two types of
Javanese rural societies and
describe different categories of
villagers. Especially in dealing
withtheruralpoor,itis important
to look at the resource base and
differentialways of their access to
resources to explain their
vulnerability.
Inthe article, we come across
four categories of poor villagers.
1. The weak and already poor.
This category includes needy
villagers who have little or no
access to resources, caring re¬
lationsandhardlynocapabili¬
tiestowork,like:widows,wid¬
owers, ill people, and old
people.
2. Thepoorwhohavealreadyfor
a longtime no assets as cows,
land and other production
goods and who have poor ac¬
cesstostableincomeandwork.
3. Thenewpoor.Thesegroupsof
people who were just able to
make a sufficient living and
stay part of society before the
crisis,butfacedamajorsetback
by reducing returns from
labour andwere forced to sell,
28 Compare with studies of BenWhite,Juliet Koningand Henry Sandee, who
alldidresearchinwealthy villageswithsubsequently riceproduction,lobster
fishing and furniture manufacturing for the internationalmarket.
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pawn or rent out productive
assets or lost access to paid
labour (oftenincities).
4. Thetemporarypoor.Thosevil¬
lagers who fell to poverty by
losingtheir jobs, orbyasevere
fall inincomedue to inflation.
These villagers were able to cope
withtheir problemsandsoonfind
newwork again.InSrihaijo,most
of them who lost work in cities
were able to find anewjob again,
while many wage labourers in
Krajan started to migrate and
added their income by working
seasonallyoutsidethevillage.The
first three categories of villagers
form the structural poor and for
themanationalrecoveryfromthe
crisis will not make difference.
Especially for them, something
more any drastic should change.
Hie most important effect of the
crisishasbeenthat thenumber of
structural the poor inrural areas
has been increased and the gap
between rich and poor widened
further.
Comparing Sriharjo and
Krajanat a moregeneral levelwe
can see that the village of Krajan
ismuchmoreremoteandisolated
than the village of Sriharjo and
morevillagershaveaccess to land.
A reasonfor this differencecanbe
found inthe populationpressure
between these villages. Sriharjo
has three times more inhabitants
thanKrajan,whichmeansthatper
villager, less land is available.
Nevertheless, the population
pressure cannot fully explain the
big difference in access to land.
Reasons for these differences are
also the rateofcommercialisation,
the organisationof villagesociety,
the impacts cf the Green
Revolution, which had little
influenceinKrajan,infrastructure
and the different agro-ecological
conditions assoilfertility,andthe
agriculturalsystem.Regardingthe
weak production bases of these
villages, we can observe that
povertyisslightlydifferentwithin
these villages as well. Sriharjo is
muchmoredependent onincomes
out of urbanareas while Krajanis
more subsistence and agriculture
oriented. In Sriharjo, most
villagershavebeenexcludedfrom
agriculture and were forced to
find work in cities already two
decades ago,while inKrajanmost
villagers stillhave some access to
land (although land of low
production quality). Labour
arrangements inreturn are more
important in Krajan and have
become more important during
thecrisis.Examplesof these labour
relationsare babunan(workingfor
a 1/5 share of the harvest),
exchange labour,clientele labour
and corvee.Dueto these forms of
access many villagers were less
hardhitby the crisis than those
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wage labourerstotallydependent
on cash incomes,both inSriharjo
and Krajan.
Hefner (1990) studied labour
utilisation in mountainous
Tengger and observed that:
"Highlanders refer regularly to
the importance of co-operation
(gotong royong) and reciprocal
labour intheir lives. They cite its
prevalence as a key point of
contrast with lowland society.
Whatever its moral value as a
symbol of uplandcommunalism,
however, in practise its role in
agriculture is minor. Most
agricultural work is done by
household labour". Instudying
theuplandeconomyofKrajan,we
come to the same conclusion. In
Sompok,thehillypartof Sriharjo,
communal labour is important,
but to a lesser extent as relations
with the outside world are much
more intense. During the crisis,
householdlabour turnedout tobe
crucial inbothvillages. Although
villagers engaged in non-
commoditised labour relations
were not that bad, they mainly
survived by the labour of the
whole family and for those in
Krajan, especially that share
tenancy is important. Sometimes
relationsbetweenthelandowners
andthealandlessbecamesoclose
that they take theshapeofpatron-
client relations. Hefner remarks
aboutpatron-clientrelations:"The
patron provides a significant
measure of social insurance by
advancing interest-free loans
duringdifficult times. Inthe long
run,these loansmaynotberepaid
even if the employee severs ties
with the employer (Hefner,
1990)". The social security
function of patrons for providing
cashturnedout tobeinsignificant
during the 97/98 crisis. Patrons
turn out to be such unimportant
socialsecurityagentsasdescribed
in the work of Hefner, but they
helpsecure the livelihoodof their
clients by offering labour
opportunities (either incitiesor in
ruralareas), shares of the harvest
and small daily help in the form
of free meals and small rice or
maize loans which indeed often
werenotexpectedtobepaidback
(see Nooteboom, 1999). Hefner
describes the aspirations of the
lowest coolies in the Tengger:
"Mostof themseetheir chancesfor
self-improvement,notincollective
solidarity with anonymous class
cohorts, but in personalized
allianceswithindividualpatrons"
(Hefner, 1990). People engage in
patron-clientrelationsifitcanhelp
them reach their goals, and the
crisis madeclear that those being
partof these kindsofdependency
relations were not among the
worse off.
Infact, the stereotypical view
that rural societies are homo-
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genous andharmoniousandmore
adapted to cope with crisis
situations has highly blinded
government employees and
intellectuals for the hardships of
the rural poor and the existing
inequalities, like inequalities
between regions, economic
sectors, classes and within
villages. At the beginning of the
crisis, the government was very
hesitant to take action. They still
seemed to believe that the rural
areas were not affectedandcould
cope with the difficulties.
Governmental responses on the
crisis were not effective, too late
and had nothing to do with the
causes of the crisis. The local
government was only adapted to
carryout programsandwaitedfor
instructions from above. When
these instructions did not come,
they were not able to take
initiatives themselves. Therefore,
it was hard to meet government
people who seemed to be deeply
concerned by the poverty of the
local population and not seldom
officials benefited substantially
from channelling help to local
people.
The students call for merdeka
(freedom)at thebeginningof 1998
in Jakarta, leading to the fall of
Soeharto, appealed strongly to
many villagers. Since Soeharto's
step down,peoplewere daringto
open up and willing to take
initiatives resulting innumerous
demonstrationsandreplacements
of village heads and government
officials. One of the similarities
that could be observed in this
movement inbothresearchareas,
was the quest for equality,justice
and poverty alleviation. In
Sriharjo, this led to numerous
demonstrations and increased
tension. InKrajan, where village
society is more hierarchical,
villagerswere afraidfor thevillage
leader and limited themselves to
gossip. Inneighbouring villages
however, a number of village
leaderswere forced to step down.
Villagers in general were happy.
They now could freely speak out
about the government,corruption,
poverty and inequalityand about
the widespread lack of govern¬
mental responsibility. In that
sense, the merdeka movements —
the freedom of speech— was a
success and has been carried the
local level. Merdeka in fact was a
bigger success than reformasi, the
reformationof up to government
and society that only partly has
taken place yet. Our data make
clear however, that for a
reformation of the Indonesian
government, not only a
reformationof thehigher levelsof
the government is needed, but
attention for restructuring the
localgovernment iscrucialaswell.
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